Fallout In Iraq From Conviction Of Fake Bomb Detector Maker

In May 2013, Jim McCormick the owner of the company that sold 7,000 fake bomb detectors to Iraq was sentenced to ten years in prison by a British court on three counts of fraud. The fallout in Baghdad is just beginning to be felt. The government is trying to act like nothing happened, while two anti-corruption groups are pushing for new investigations, and implicating Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and other top officials. Unfortunately, while committees can look into these matters there is little likelihood that anything substantive will happen.

A fake bomb detector still being used at a checkpoint in Baghdad, May 2013 (AFP)

After the news broke in Iraq that Jim McCormick had been convicted there was little change on the ground. Deputy Interior Minister Adnan Asadi, who is the de facto head of the ministry told the press that the bomb detectors would eventually be replaced, but he did not mention how or when. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said that the authorities took care of the bomb detectors a long time ago seemingly blowing off the McCormick conviction. Later he told a press conference that some of the detectors actually worked. This was despite the fact that the British court proved that there were no working parts within the so-called detectors. Agence France Presse quoted a policeman in Baghdad who said that they were under orders to continue to use the anti-explosive devices even though they knew they did not work. Only in Dhi Qar did the police announce that they would stop using the detectors, and would be using bomb-sniffing dogs instead. That province happens to be in the south where there are hardly any attacks, so its decision would not have a real effect upon security in the country. Baghdad on the other hand sees the most violence, yet the government is acting like the McCormick case means nothing. The premier’s statement is a perfect example since the detectors are still in daily use, so obviously they have not been dealt with properly.

Parliament and the anti-corruption Integrity Commission are taking the matter much more seriously. Immediately after the sentencing of McCormick Iraq’s integrity committee in the legislature said that officials from the Office of the Commanding General of the Armed Forces and former Interior Minister Jawad Bolani were involved in buying the fake detectors. Parliamentarian Jawad Shihili stated that both the inspector general at Interior and the Science Ministry objected to the purchase, but higher officials insisted upon it. Al-Mada received a memo from Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s office as commander and chief that okayed buying the devices. That was despite a British officer warning the Interior Ministry that the detectors did not work. This new evidence led the integrity committee to form a joint committee with the Interior and Defense Ministries’ inspector generals to investigate the matter. The independent Integrity Commission went on to issue arrest warrants for five directors of companies involved with buying the anti-bomb equipment. A further look into the matter is definitely required as the McCormick trial revealed that at least 15 Iraqi officials received bribes from his company to finalize the deal. So far only General Jihad Jabiri the former head of the explosives department at the Interior Ministry and two others have been jailed over the devices in 2011. That occurred after Minister Bolani was removed from office, because he was protecting Jabiri and the others from prosecution.

The problem with investigating corruption in Iraq is that it can only go so far. Bribes and thievery are so imbedded within the government that it has actually become part of the way of running the country as pilfering from the state is considered part of the payoff of holding office, and a way to reward followers. That severely limits the ability to charge and successfully prosecute people, because the political parties and their leadership will block it just as Minister Bolani did. New documents can be uncovered, people can be named, new information revealed about the fake bomb detectors, and maybe even some company heads might be taken to court, but those that were truly responsible will never be touched. That would open the door to everyone involved in the system being charged, and that simply won’t happen in Iraq right now.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraq PM insists some fake bomb detectors work,” 5/20/13

- “Iraq province to ditch fake bomb detectors,” 5/14/13

- “Iraq still using James McCormick’s fake bomb detectors at checkpoints,” 5/3/13

AIN, “Shihaili: Maliki’s assistants, MOI officials involved in corruption,” 5/5/13

Booth, Robert, “Fake bomb detector conman jailed for 10 years,” Guardian, 5/2/13

Al-Mada, “A document proving that Maliki’s office instructed to purchase sonar despite warnings from British inability for detecting explosives,” 5/12/13

- “Iraq’s Integrity Committee pursuing the inventor of explosives detectors and 5 local companies,” 5/14/13

Morris, Steven, Jones, Meirion and Booth, Robert, “The ‘magic’ bomb detector that endangered lives all over the world,” Guardian, 4/23/13

Al Mustaqbal News, “The names of directors of companies involved with explosives detection devices,” 5/14/13

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Rising Tensions In Iraq’s Anbar Province, Raids, Kidnapped Soldiers, Collapse of Talks Offer

Iraq’s Anbar province is seeing increasing tension. Since December there have been two large protests going on in Ramadi and Fallujah. After the government raid upon the Hawija demonstration site in Tamim governorate in April 2013 there has been an uptick in attacks as well. In May, things picked up with raids upon the residences of two leaders of the protests, as well as the kidnapping of several dozen soldiers and police, and the collapse of an offer to talk with Baghdad. With the way things are going this could be leading up to a security crackdown in the governorate aimed at not only clearing out militants, but shutting down the demonstrations as well.

The latest incident was a raid upon Mohammed Khamis Abu Risha, the nephew of a leading Awakening chief and organizer of the Ramadi protests. On May 18, there were clashes between tribesmen and security forces outside of Ramadi as the latter were looking for Abu Risha. That resulted in the deaths of a woman and her three children, and four army vehicles being set on fire. Abu Risha has an arrest warrant out for him for his alleged involvement in the murder of five soldiers on April 27. The government blamed the leaders of the protest movement for the incident, including Abu Risha, the demonstrator’s spokesman Said al-Lafi, and a prominent preacher Qusay al-Janabi. Abu Risha is the nephew of Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha who helped found the Awakening movement in the province, and is currently one of the organizers in Ramadi. Initially it appeared that local politicians and the protesters were attempting to defuse the situation by cooperating with the authorities. The Anbar provincial council for instance, said that it worked out a deal with the security forces to allow them to search the protest area in Ramadi to look for the culprits, and turned over the names of three suspects soon after the soldiers were killed at the end of April. The Sunni Endowment demanded that the demonstrators hand over the killers, while Sheikh Abu Risha claimed that two people had been given to the Ramadi police. That obviously didn’t work as the army and police are still looking for the younger Abu Risha as the raid showed. The fact that the incident led to fighting is also bad news as it can only increase the already high tensions in Anbar.

Sheikh Sulaiman now has an arrest warrant out for him on terrorism charges (Los Angeles Times)

The government also has an arrest warrant out for Sheikh Ali Hatem Sulaiman on terrorism charges. On May 16, Sulaiman told CNN that the army raided a farm he owned near Ramadi looking for him. His tribesmen surrounded the army headquarters in Ramadi in response, telling them they had to withdraw from the governorate, and threatening violence by the Pride and Dignity Army if they didn’t. Sulaiman is allegedly one of the organizers behind the tribal army, which was set up to defend the Ramadi protesters after the Hawija incident. The sheikh is a member of the powerful Dulaim tribe, and has attached himself to the Ramadi protests. He has been known to give inflammatory speeches threatening violence against the security forces and government, which might be why they are looking for him. This could be another cause for increased violence in Anbar as it could lead Sulaiman’s followers to follow through with his threats.

On top of that insurgents are attempting to exploit the anger in Anbar for their own ends. Gunmen ambushed and kidnapped a number of police and soldiers in the province on May 18. At first, it was reported that 10 policemen were taken at a fake checkpoint outside of Ramadi. Then a spokesman for the Defense Ministry said that 35 soldiers had also been abducted. The Anbar Salvation Council later stated that the army launched an operation around Ramadi looking for the missing security force elements. The Council blamed Al Qaeda in Iraq for the incidents. Three people from Karbala who were travelling through Anbar after visiting Jordan were also said to have been kidnapped. Immediately afterward, a member of the Anbar Tribal Chiefs Council Mohammed Alwani condemned the security force members being taken. It also prompted the protest leaders in the province to hold a meeting to talk about the deteriorating security situation. They told the press they were trying to keep the demonstrations peaceful despite the worsening situation in Anbar. In the last couple years Al Qaeda in Iraq and other insurgent groups had lost most of their standing in the governorate. The Awakening movement started there, and successfully pushed the militants to the outskirts of Anbar with the help of the Americans. Now, after Hawija, the insurgency has a new life exploiting the growing resentment Sunnis have towards Baghdad. It has used Hawija to claim that the government will ignore their demands, and that the only alternative then is to fight the authorities, which they claim are Persians controlled by Iran. As a result, there has been a dramatic increase in attacks in Anbar and other provinces in the last few weeks.

Spiritual leader of the Anbar protest movement Sheikh Saadi said he gave up on talks with the government (Al Sharqiya)

Finally, the Ramadi movement has given up on negotiating with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Sheikh Abdul Malik Saadi who is the spiritual leader of much of the protest movement in Iraq said that he was ending his initiative to talk with the government. He blamed Baghdad for ignoring his offer, and warned that there might be “dire consequences” as a result. In May, Saadi endorsed forming a committee that would meet with the government. He suggested Samarra in Salahaddin as a suitable site since it is in a predominately Sunni province, but the city holds a holy Shite shrine. The idea of talks between the two sides seemed to come about after the efforts of Deputy Premier Saleh al-Mutlaq to meet with various officials such as Governor Qasim al Fahadawi, protest organizers, and tribal leaders in Anbar. Afterward, they agreed to negotiate with Baghdad. Saadi then announced that a committee be formed. How far any talks would have gone is an open question. The protest movement has some unrealistic demands such as completely ending deBaathification and calling for the removal of Premier Maliki. At the same time, negotiations could have helped the two sides come to some kind of compromises. Now that option has ended for now.

Anbar has been a hotbed of opposition to the government for the last several months. When arrest warrants were issued for former Finance Minister Rafi al-Issawi’s bodyguards in December 2012, Anbar immediately began organizing protests in support since the minister was from Fallujah. This eventually became the impetus for similar movements across several other provinces. Originally, the demonstrators voiced complaints about what they saw as their victimization by the authorities such as mass arrests, the use of the anti-terrorism law, and secret informers. Since then the movement has become more militant and sectarian with constant denouncements of Baghdad being run by Iran, and some organizers being connected to the insurgency. The recent raids, kidnappings, and the end of the call for talks with the authorities can only add to this growing fire. Even if the mainstream protest movement like the one in Ramadi attempts to remain peaceful, it is apparent that more and more people in the governorate are at least open to the passive if not active support for attacks upon the security forces. That is giving new life to the insurgency, which has been attempting to exploit the demonstrations since they began as an organizing and rally point for a renewed fight against the government. The political deadlock in Baghdad is not helping the matter, because parliament is incapable of passing any legislation right now that might satisfy some of the demands made by Anbar. This all might be leading to a larger and sustained security operation in the province to crackdown on the insurgency, and perhaps end the protest movement at the same time. That would end two problems for the prime minister with one stone. If that choice is made there’s no telling what the lasting effects might be. It could simply make the situation worse by proving the militants’ propaganda correct that the government has no intent of dealing with the demonstrators, and that violence is the only answer. That doesn’t mean Iraq is heading for a new civil war, but security is definitely worsening with no end in sight for the immediate future.

SOURCES

Al-Abdeh, Malik, “Sunnism is Our Slogan,” The Majalla, 4/30/13

AIN, “AOC assures kidnapping 5 security elements,” 5/18/13

- “Breaking news…Several tribes form military force in Anbar,” 4/27/13

- “Sunni Endowment calls Anbar protestors to hand over killers of 5 soldiers soon,” 4/28/13

- “Urgent…..IPs kidnapped eastern Anbar,” 5/18/13

- “Urgent….Many tribes withdraw from Anbar protests yard,” 4/27/13

- “Urgent …Security forces allowed entering demonstrations square,” 4/30/13

Al-Ali, Daoud, “ball in PM’s court: anbar’s protestors agree to negotiate,” Niqash, 5/16/13

Aswat al-Iraq, “Two Fallujah killers handed over,” 4/28/13

Independent Press Agency, “Anbar operations threaten stormed Square sit-in and a curfew imposed,” 4/27/13

Al-Janoob, “Mohammed al-Askari declares the readiness of the army to attack and free the kidnapped soldiers in Anbar,” 5/19/13

Al Jazeera, “Deadly Iraq violence spills into fourth day,” 5/18/13

National Iraqi News Agency, “BREAKING NEWS Anbar’s protest organizers hold emergency meeting,” 5/18/13

- “BREAKING NEWS. The declaration of formation of “ Alizah wa-Akharamah/pride and dignity/ army by the protestors in Anbar province,” 4/26/13

- “BREAKING NEWS. Maliki threatens to confront armed elements formed in Anbar sit-ins,” 5/1/13

- “Member of Anbar Tribal Chiefs Council condemns kidnapping soldiers,” 5/18/13

- “Saadi directs to form a committee constituent of protesters to negotiate with the government,” 5/13/13

Parker, Ned, “Sword of division is poised over Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, 5/10/13

Reuters, “Thirteen killed, 10 police kidnapped in Iraq violence,” 5/18/13

Sadah, Ali Abel, “Sunni Tribes in Anbar, Kirkuk Prepare for Battle,” Al-Monitor, 5/3/13

Saeed, Samer Elias, “Inside Iraq: Sunni tribes call for arms,” Azzaman, 4/26/13

Shafaq News, “Anbar reveal disagreement within Ramadi and Fallujah Sit-in squares,” 5/13/13

- “Breaking News … Iraqi army forces backed by helicopters start security operation in Ramadi,” 5/19/13

- “Saadi gives up his initiative,” 5/19/13

Tawfeeq, Mohammed, “Tribal fighters clash with Iraqi army amid rising tensions,” CNN, 5/16/13

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Iraq’s Troubled Agricultural Sector

In May 2013 Deputy Agricultural Minister Ghazi Obeidi told the press that Iraq’s farm sector was booming. He claimed that the country would soon be meeting domestic demand for fruits, vegetables, and wheat. Obeidi went on to state that was due to the Agricultural Ministry’s policies, which include the banning of certain imports, and providing new crops to help Iraqi farmers. Agriculture is one of the most important industries after oil and gas. It is the second largest employer, and one-third of the population lives in rural areas. Currently the countryside is suffering from high rates of poverty and food insecurity, which has led to a mass migration to Iraq’s cities. After decades of neglect due to sanctions and wars, agriculture could be one field that with proper development could provide much needed jobs to Iraqis, and stabilize farming regions. Unfortunately, there are major structural barriers to achieving these goals, despite the deputy minister’s pronouncement.

Farmers like this one in Basra face a number of structural and environmental barriers to succeeding (Reuters)

Farming in Iraq has suffered some hard times over the last few decades. It accounted for 23.5% of jobs in 2008, but only contributed 3.9% of GDP. Those figures have been going down as the Agricultural Ministry reported a drop in the number of farmers and areas underproduction in recent years. As a result, Iraq’s agricultural yields are 50-75% lower than its neighbors, and that difference has increased in the last ten years. The United States Agency for International Development reported that crop production in Iraq went up from 2001 to 2002, and then fluctuated before hitting a steady decline after 2005. Using 1999-2001 as a baseline, the country’s output was up 6% in 2005, and then went down by 17% by 2009. That compared to the rest of the Middle East and North Africa that saw a steady increase during the 2000s going from up 1% in 2001 to up 25% by 2009. After the end of sanctions in 2003, Iraq’s agricultural sector should have been freed of restrictions, and had a renaissance. Instead, government and environmental factors have led to its decline. 

Crop Production Index (1999-2001=100)

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Iraq	108.0	129.0	103.0	101.0	106.0	105.0	100.0	81.0	83.0
MENA	101.1	109.5	115.2	117.7	120.6	126.7	122.7	116.2	125.2
Lower Middle Income Countries	102.9	104.7	108.8	113.8	117.4	120.8	124.4	129.5	128.0
World	101.7	101.9	105.1	111.9	113.4	114.6	117.9	122.5	122.2

Rural areas of Iraq are suffering. 39% of the countryside is poor compared to 16% in urban areas. That is a direct reflection of the sorry state of farming, which provides the main livelihood for rural families. The country has been flooded from cheap food imports from neighboring countries like Iran, Turkey, Jordan, and Syria, which Iraqi producers cannot compete with. In 2012, the country bought 50-80% of its vegetables from abroad. One major reason is that the United States removed many tariffs immediately after the 2003 invasion. Another is that Iraqis are using 30 year old farm techniques due to sanctions, and the lingering affects of past wars that isolated them from modern improvements like the use of sprinklers and drip irrigation to new seeds to new equipment. That underdevelopment means that there is huge potential for growth in the industry. Baghdad has talked about jump starting the farm sector to provide jobs and development in rural areas for years, but these policies have largely failed.

The Iraqi government has tried a number of different tactics to help agriculture, but they have not worked. One problem is that not enough money has been budgeted for the Agricultural Ministry. In 2010 it received $1.4 billion for investment, which was below the mark set in the 5-year national development plan. Even with that money, the Ministry’s policies were ill advised. In 2008 it attempted to double the prices it paid to farmers in an effort to boost production. In 2009 and 2011, the government tried banning the import of vegetables and fruits, and in the former year it tried to impose a tariff to raise the cost on cheap foreign farm products. This year, it announced that it would increase the purchase of wheat, barley, and corn to help out farmers, provide them with loans, and assist with new irrigation equipment. So far, none of those policies have worked. The 2009 tariff for instance, was never enforced, and the import bans caused huge price increases, because domestic farmers could not meet demand. Iraq’s water supply system is also inefficient and fragmented. There are three different delivery systems, one in Kurdistan, one run by the central government to the provinces, and one for Baghdad. None of them are coordinated. There are no meters on the system, so there is no way for the authorities to collect fees on users, which means there’s no check on usage. Finally, the government restricts the use of new seeds, fertilizer, and other inputs, all of which are under state control. It takes up to two years to register new seed varieties, and can cost anywhere from $2,000-$3,700, a huge sum for the average Iraqi. The Agricultural Ministry, and others control state-run enterprises that make fertilizer, farming chemicals, and other agricultural products. Those plants are not productive, which cause constant shortages, and the publicly produced fertilizer and other inputs are given to middlemen free of charge who then sell them at very high rates to farmers. All together these are huge hurdles for any rural family to overcome. The state’s policies have often backfired, and hurt farmers. On top of that, the government mismanages the production and distribution of products necessary for their work. All together the authorities have been a hindrance rather than a benefit to the agriculture sector.

An additional issue is the food ration system. Started during the 1990s sanctions, the state-run food distribution system is the largest in the world, and a major impediment to the growth of farming. The rations require huge imports of products that could be produced domestically. In 2012 for instance, Iraq bought 5.4 tons of foreign food products for the system. Those subsidized imports lower prices by an estimated 20%, and undercut domestic farmers. According to the United Nations, Iraqis are less dependent upon the ration system than before, with the exceptions of wheat and rice. In November 2012, when the cabinet proposed ending the rations, and replacing it with cash payments it reversed itself in five days due to political pressure, namely concerns about how the change would play out during the 2013 provincial elections. Not only that, but the system is highly inefficient and corrupt, yet there’s no political will to modify or end it once again undermining farmers.

Regional and environmental factors also impede the development of the agricultural industry. The land of two rivers is getting less and less water from those two giants the Euphrates and the Tigris. Only 3% of the Euphrates and 32% of the Tigris originate in Iraq. In contrast, 68% of the Tigris comes from Turkey and Iran. That means those two upstream countries along with Syria control much of Iraq’s water, and they have been building dams and diverting the water for their own uses cutting Iraq’s supply since the 1990s. There is no cooperation with Iran, Turkey, and Syria over water policy, which means the problem is going to get worse. Within Iraq, demand has gone up, and there have been successive droughts over the last few years. That has meant the country has gone from water secure to water stressed, and the U.N. has warned that it could become water scarce by 2025. Finally, southern Iraq is suffering from high levels of soil salinity. Up to 50% of the cultivated land has salt issues, and the farming techniques used have made it worse. Baghdad has consistently called for talks with its neighbors over the Tigris and Euphrates, but that has gone nowhere, and the other nations don’t seem interested to begin with. Because Iraq is so behind in its farming methods the salinity issue is also going to get worse. Finally, the droughts are natural disasters, which the government has found no solutions to, because it is so inefficient, and lacks the planning to deal with such issues.

Iraq needs a sound government policy if it hopes to save its declining farming sector. A strategic plan needs to be put into place that involves modernizing the industry, loosening state control over inputs, while strengthening limits on water usage, reforming the food ration system, dealing with the cheap imports, and seriously addressing the problems it has with its neighbors. Baghdad has done little of this. Instead it has followed a haphazard approach that is uncoordinated, and often hurts those that it is trying to help. Sometimes it doesn’t even follow its own policies like with the tariff on foreign farm goods. The root cause of these problems is the lack of political will to make any meaningful changes, and a lack of effective planning. That is resulting in the continued decline in agriculture, and the migration of farmers to the cities. That is having a ripple affect upon society by increasing the housing shortage. This is a shame since farming could be a major source of jobs, and a way to diversify the economy away from its dependence upon oil. Farmers simply don’t have the means to overcome all these structural and environmental factors on their own, and until the government gets its act together, and gives this topic the attention it deserves the rural areas of Iraq will continue to suffer.

SOURCES

Adel, Shaymaa, “Iraq imported more than 5 million tons of food last year,” Azzaman, 3/29/13

Al-Aukaili, Khawla, “Iraqi agricultural sector booming, says deputy minister,” Azzaman, 5/14/13

Decamme, Guillaume, “Iraq ration card reform sparks anger,” Agence France Presse, 11/12/12

IRIN, “Less dependent on food rations,” 5/7/13

Kadhem, Adel, “Iraq’s wheat harvest exceeded 3 million tons in 2012,” Azzaman, 2/15/13

Shafaq News, “6,500 acres of Diyala’s farms and orchards threatened by drought,” 3/23/13

Al-Shaher, Omar, “Iraqi Agriculture in Crisis,” Al-Monitor, 1/29/13

Al-Taie, Khalid, “Iraq aims to support local farmers through new proposal,” Al-Shorfa, 4/12/13

Tijara Provincial Economic Growth Program, “Assessment of Current and Anticipated Economic Priority In Iraq,” United States Agency for International Development, 10/4/12

Al-Ukaili, Khawla, “Iraq raises prices of locally produced grains,” Azzaman, 4/17/13

Al-Zubaidi, Hassan Latif, “social welfare flip-flop: why iraq’s ration card can’t be scrapped,” Niqash, 11/15/12

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Why Anbar’s Sheikh Ali Hatem Sulaiman Joined Iraq’s Protest Movement

Sheikh Ali Hatem Sulaiman is one of the leaders of the Dulaim tribe, one of the largest in western Iraq that stretches into neighboring Jordan. Sulaiman has attached himself to the protest movement in Anbar, and has become known for his inflammatory speeches. It wasn’t that long ago however, that the sheikh was an ally of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. His path that led him from a supporter to an opponent of the government is due to Sulaiman’s opportunism, and desire to become a prominent sheikh throughout Iraq like his grandfather once was.

Sheikh Sulaiman has been trying to return to his family’s once prominent position in Anbar  (Los Angeles Times)

Sheikh Ali Hatem Sulaiman has joined the Anbar protest movement in his latest attempt to gain power. Sulaiman has worked his way into the demonstrators by befriending their spokesman Said al-Lafi. The sheikh has been known to give outrageous speeches in the city, often threatening violence. As a result, he was removed from the electoral list for the 2013 provincial vote, which has been delayed in Anbar. In January, Sulaiman started off by simply repeating some of the main demands of the movement such as releasing female prisoners. By March, he was accusing Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki of working for Iran. In April, he said that tribes in Anbar should arm themselves, warned that the security forces should not leave their barracks, because people wanted their blood after the government raid upon the demonstrators in Hawija. Then in May he demanded that Maliki be replaced, and said that the Pride and Dignity Army was ready to defend the protesters if the authorities attacked them. Sulaiman has embraced the Ramadi movement, and given these types of speeches in order to raise his profile in Anbar. That city’s protests have been more moderate than in others, some of which are connected to the insurgency. In order to make himself stand out, he has turned to more virulent accusations against Baghdad, and made reference to taking up the gun. That was a turn for Sulaiman who was once aligned with the prime minister.

Before, Sheikh Sulaiman’s plans involved attaching himself to the Americans, and then the Maliki government. Sulaiman was one of the founders of the Anbar Awakening Council that involved tribal fighters that turned against Al Qaeda in Iraq in the province. In 2008, he formed a Tribal Support Council in the governorate as part of Prime Minister Maliki’s strategy to build up support amongst sheikhs. By 2010, he joined the premier’s State of Law list for that year’s parliamentary elections. At the time, Maliki was looking for Sunni allies to expand his base outside of his traditional Shiite followers. That was a decision that was not going to win the sheikh many supporters, especially when the prime minister backed the banning of candidates before the vote for being former Baathists. That marriage of convenience didn’t last as Sulaiman quickly quit the alliance after the balloting. The next year, he joined the call to make Anbar a region in response to a wave of arrests of alleged Baathists by Maliki. By the end of 2011, he had his house in Baghdad raided, and some of his guards were arrested for ties to the former regime. He blamed Maliki, and accused the premier of using the security forces for his own political ends. All of these moves were aimed at gaining notoriety and power. Allying with the Americans through the Awakening movement opened up a new source of money and weapons, and rode the wave of Sunnis turning on the insurgency. Then working with Baghdad added Sulaiman to Maliki’s patronage network through first the Tribal Councils, and then as part of the prime minister’s party. That paid little dividends in Anbar however as the prime minister had few supporters there. That led Sulaiman to break with Maliki, and become a critic. The sheikh therefore has been characterized by key strategic moves along with a healthy dose of opportunism in his attempt to restore his family’s standing.

Since 2003, Sheikh Sulaiman has tried to pick winners in the ever-changing sea of Iraqi politics, and ride that wave until another force emerges. That explains why he went from being a supporter of Prime Minister Maliki to an opponent. His tactics have brought him wealth and a good share of notoriety, but probably not as much as he would like. Other Anbar sheikhs such as Ahmed Abu Risha have had much more success, which likely bothers Sulaiman to no end. That’s because Sulaiman would like to have the same status and power of not only them, but of his grandfather who was one of the leading tribal leaders in Iraq during the late Ottoman and British mandate period. It’s this memory that is a driving force for the sheikh. That’s probably why Sulaiman has emerged as a firebrand speaker at the Ramadi protests. How else might the former try to adhere himself to the masses other than making himself stand out with addresses aimed at attacking the prime minister’s rule, and threatening violence if the government doesn’t change? Whenever the protests end, the sheikh will have to find another cause in an attempt to become an influential leader not only in Anbar, but nationally as well as Sulaiman aspires to.

SOURCES

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